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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Severson's 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim on the Basis of Res 
Judicata 
Mr. Severson has set out why the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis of res judicata at pages 6-7 of his Opening 
Brief. Specifically, the district court erred because the issue decided in the direct appeal (whether 
the prosecutorial misconduct at trial rose to the level of fundamental error) was different from the 
claim in post-conviction before the court (whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective). 
Therefore, neither issue nor claim preclusion can apply and dismissal on the basis of res judicata 
was erroneous. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). 
The state concedes that claim preclusion cannot apply because a substantive prosecutorial 
misconduct claim, as raised in the direct appeal, is a different claim than a claim that counsel was 
ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct in closing. Respondent's Brief at page 
11. 
However, the state appears to assert that issue preclusion should be applied because the 
prejudice analysis for a substantive claim of prosecutorial misconduct is "more stringent" than 
the prejudice standard applied to post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Respondent's Brief at pages 11-12, comparing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome. From this the state concludes that Mr. Severson 
cannot meet his burden of proving prejudice for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Id. 
However, the state's conclusion is wrong because the Supreme Court never reached the 
question of whether the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the 
direct appeal. 
In the direct appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct 
under the fundamental error standard: 
... Misconduct will be regarded as fundamental error when it goes to the 
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or ... to the foundation of the case or 
takes from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no 
court could or ought to permit him to waive. However, even when prosecutorial 
misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction will not be reversed 
when that error is harmless. Under the harmless error doctrine, a conviction will 
stand if the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result 
would have been reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not 
occurred. 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,716,215 P.3d 414,436 (2009) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
Without ever reaching the harmless error analysis, the Supreme Court denied appellate 
relief because it found that none of the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error -
that none of the misconduct went to the foundation or basis of Mr. Severson's rights or to the 
foundation of the case or took from him a right which was essential to his defense and which no 
court could or ought to permit him to waive. In particular, with regard to the misconduct during 
closing, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statements that nobody that has testified 
knows what happened in the Severson house "did not deprive Severson of due process or render 
his trial fundamentally unfair." 147 Idaho at 719,215 P.3d at 439. With regard to the comments 
about Mary speaking from her grave, the Court found the comments inflammatory, but held that 
"because the statements did not result in an unfair trial or deprive Severson of due process, they 
were not fundamental error." 147 Idaho at 720,215 P.3d at 440. With regard to the prosecutor's 
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reference's to Mary's family, the Supreme Court held that the statements were "arguably 
improper" but did not rise to the level of fundamental error because "[t]he statements did not 
impact the fairness of Severson' s trial or deprive him of due process and, therefore, were not 
fundamental error." Id. The Court concluded its analysis of the unobjected to prosecutorial 
misconduct: 
Id. 
In sum, because none of the prosecutor's statements during closing argument rose 
to the level of fundamental error, they do not justify reversing Severson's 
conviction. 
The Supreme Court never applied the harmless error standard. Therefore, the state's 
argument that issue preclusion should apply is incorrect and should be rejected by this Court. 
The district court erred in dismissing based upon res judicata. 
B. Mr. Severson Did Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Mr. Severson has set out how his petition raised a genuine issue of material fact as to 
ineffective assistance of counsel thus precluding summary dismissal. Appellant's Opening Brief 
at pages 5-18. The state has countered that Mr. Severson is incorrect for two reasons: 1) that Mr. 
Severson failed to raise a genuine question of material fact as to prejudice, and 2) that Mr. 
Severson failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome a presumption that the failure to object was 
a reasonable tactical decision. Respondent's Brief at pages 13-16. 
Addressing the state's second argument first - Mr. Severson did raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to deficient perfonnance. 
'To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present 
evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon 
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which the applicant bears the burden of proof.' State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 
72, 90 P.3d 278,297 (2003). A 'primafacie case' means the 'production of 
enough evidence to allow the fact-finder to infer the fact at issue and rule in the 
party's favor.' Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 
1999) .... 
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,728,202 P.3d 642, 650 (2007). 
In determining whether a prima facie case has been pled, the courts are required to accept 
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true and shall liberally construe the facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party on a motion for summary dismissal. Hauschulz v. 
State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007). This standard is applied in order to 
"avoid dismissal of an inartfully drawn complaint that gives adequate notice of the claims sought 
to be asserted." Id, at 834-35, 172 P .3d at 1113-1114, quoting Amco Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Inv. 
Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738-39, 101 P.3d 226, 231-232 (2004). 
The state has argued that Mr. Severson did not plead a prima facie case of deficient 
performance in failing to object to its misconduct in closing, examining each instance of 
misconduct individually. Respondent's Brief pages 14-16. 
The state begins with what it refers to as the "Fifth Amendment statement." Id., page 14. 
The state asserts that the Supreme Court held that its comment that nobody was present in the 
house except for Mr. Severson and his wife and neither had testified was not a comment on the 
right to remain silent. Id However, that is not what the Supreme Court held. Rather, the 
Supreme Court held that "Severson has failed to prove that the prosecutor's statement was an 
impermissible comment on his silence that constituted fundamental error." State v. Severson, 
147 ldaho at 439,215 P.3d at 719 (emphasis added). Again, the Court was applying the 
fundamental error analysis which required it to find that the error violated due process or 
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rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The Court did not hold that the statement was proper -
rather it held that the statement could be given more than one interpretation and that it was one 
statement in a 17-day trial so it did not result in a due process violation or a fundamentally unfair 
trial. Id This is not a res judicata holding that the statement was not an objectionable instance 
of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The state next turns to its argument to the jury that Mary was speaking to us from the 
grave. While the state acknowledges that the Supreme Court held that the argument was 
inflammatory because it was likely designed to appeal to the sympathies and passions of the jury, 
147 Idaho at 439-440, 215 P.3d at 719-720, the state continues that the inflammatory comments 
were simply referring to Mary's body providing evidence and, "viewed this way" it was not 
unreasonable for counsel to not object. Respondent's Brief at page 15. Ignoring for a moment 
that the Supreme Court did find that the state's argument before the jury was misconduct 
( appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are 
impermissible, State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007)), when the 
claim must be "viewed this way" to reach a decision against the petitioner, the petitioner has pied 
a prima facie case and summary dismissal is not appropriate. Hauschulz v. State, supra, 
requiring pleadings to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. 
The state lastly argues that the failure to object to clear misconduct in its argument 
referencing Mary's family could have been a strategic choice and therefore summary dismissal 
was appropriate. The state asserts that counsel may not have objected in order to avoid alienating 
the jury by appearing to marginalize Mary. Respondent's Brief at page 15. Again, the state is 
arguing that summary dismissal was appropriate because construing Mr. Severson's allegations 
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in the light most favorable to the state, the state would prevail after an evidentiary hearing. But, 
that is not the standard for summary dismissal. In summary dismissal, the court is required to 
accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true and liberally construe the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. Hauschulz v. State, supra. In cases where the 
record does not establish a strategic purpose for counsel's actions or where there cannot be a 
strategic purpose or where the error is so great even if counsel believed it was a strategic 
decision, the strategy itself is deficient performance, summary dismissal is not appropriate. 
Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,658,946 P.2d 71, 80 (Ct. App. 1997), holding that errors in 
strategy can be so grave that they represent circumstances in which an issue of ineffective 
assistance exists; Vickv. State, 131 Idaho 121,952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), holding that 
summary disposition was inappropriate where counsel failed to request or provide a report 
satisfying the requirements of LC. § 19-2522, did not object to the imposition of sentence 
without the benefit of such a report, and did not submit other readily available psychological 
information without undertaking an analysis of whether the decision to not act could have been 
strategic; Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,443, 163 P.3d 222,232 (Ct. App. 2007), holding that 
summary dismissal was inappropriate when the record contained no explanation of why counsel 
failed to pursue potentially exculpatory and obtainable information; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567,225 P.3d 700 (2009), holding that petitioner had set out aprimafacie claim of ineffective 
assistance when the record did not show a strategic purpose for the failure to object to incorrect 
jury instruction. 
In this case, summary disposition was also not appropriate. Counsel did object to other 
instances of misconduct - therefore the state's theory that counsel strategically chose not to object 
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to this particular piece of misconduct is at best highly speculative and requires drawing 
inferences not liberally in favor of Mr. Severson, but rather liberally in favor of the state. As in 
Milburn, Vick, Knutsen, and McKay, summary disposition was not appropriate. 
The state also argues that Mr. Severson did not plead a prima facie case of prejudice from 
the deficient performance. Respondent's Brief at page 12-13. The state's argument is that 
because the Supreme Court in the direct appeal found the errors harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, Mr. Severson cannot plead aprimafacie case of prejudice. However, as discussed above, 
the Supreme Court did not find that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Rather, the Supreme Court never reached the harmless error analysis. Thus, 
the state's argument fails. Moreover, as discussed in the Opening Brief, Mr. Severson did plead 
a prima facie case of prejudice. 
Because Mr. Severson did plead a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
raising a genuine issue of material fact as to both deficient performance and prejudice resulting in 
a denial of his state and federal constitutional rights to counsel, Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, U.S. 
Const. Amends. 6 and 14, this Court should reverse the order of partial summary dismissal. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Severson respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the order of partial summary dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this ti!_ day of May, 2014. 
D~gAlA(?~C..---:.--
Dennis Benj arnin 
Attorneys for Larry Severson 
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